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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
statutes is race prejudice. The "Land of Liberty" is perpetrating a caste system by law. We cannot make colored people socially equal by court decree, but as individuals and citizens they
deserve equality in law, in accordance with the intentions of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
STUART W. CONNER.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-NECESSITY OF
JUDGMENT TO SET ASIDE
I.
Section 29-209 (8605), Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, declares that "a creditor can avoid the act or obligation of his
debtor for fraud only where the fraud obstructs the enforcement,
by legal process, of his right to property affected by the transfer or obligation." Interpretation of this statute has given rise
to the rule that in an action to set aside a conveyance by an insolvent on grounds of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, the complaint must allege that the creditor has established
a lien upon the property sought to be transferred, either by attachment or by judgment with a return nulla bona.' Several
Montana decisions have adhered to this rule without specific
reference to the statutory provision.
In 1945 Montana adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.! The question is posed: Does Section 29-209 (8605)
conflict with sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Act?' More
specifically, how, if at all, has the adoption of the Act changed
the preliminary conditions governing the remedy in equity?
Thus far there has been no interpretation by the Supreme Court
of Montana of the provisions pertinent to this article. The Act
does not explicitly state that a judgment with a return unsatisfied is no longer essential to maintaining a suit in equity to
annul a fraudulent conveyance. Certainty would have been
promoted if such were the case. However, the Act appears to
imply that a creditor can avoid a conveyance fraudulent as to
'Ferrell v. Elling (1929) 84 Mont. 384, 276 P. 432; First Natl. Bank v.
Conner (1929) 85 Mont. 229, 278 P. 143.
'Northern Mont. State Bank v. Collins et al (1923) 67 Mont. 575, 216
P. 330; Missoula Trust and Saving Bank v. Boos (1938) 106 Mont. 294,
77 P. 385; Edenfield v. C. V. Seal Co., Inc., et al (1928) 83 Mont. 49,
270 P. 642; Stone-Ordean Wells Co. v. Strong et al (1933) 94 Mont. 20,
20 P.(2d) 639.
'R.C.M. 1947, §§29-101 to 29-113.
'R.C.M. 1947, §§29-109, 29-110.
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him without first exhausting his remedies at law. A careful consideration of sections 1, 9, and 10 of the Act,' and an examination of reported decisions, where the pertinent provisions have
been interpreted, support this assumption.
II.
1. Section 1 of the Act gives the definition of a creditor."
"Creditor is a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." It might be arguable that the word "creditor" should
be construed as a judgment creditor, but it can hardly be said
that an unmatured creditor is in position to reduce his claim to
judgment.
2. Section 9 states the remedies available to a creditor
whose claims have matured.'
(1)
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent
as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for
fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the
time of the purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such purchaser,
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim,
or,
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy
execution upon the property conveyed.
Judge (later Mr. Justice) Cardozo, delivering the majority
opinion in the leading case of American Surety Company v. Conner,'held that the alternative remedy provided in subsection (1)
(b) of section 9 of the Uniform Act does not deprive the creditor
of the right to proceed in equity to have the conveyance set
aside. Justice Cardozo's conclusion has since been adopted in
many other decisions in jurisdictions where the Uniform Act has
been adopted."
3. Section 10 states the remedies available to the creditor
whose claim has not matured.'
5
R.C.M.
6

1947, §§29-101, 29-109, 29-110.
R.C.M. 1947, §29-101.
'R.C.M. 1947, §29-109.
'(1928) 232 N.Y.S. 94, 166 N.E. 783.
"American Bulb Co. v. Spicack (1935) 281 N.Y.S. 513, 156 Misc. 614;
Herring-Curtis Co. et al v. Curtiss (1931) 252 N.Y.S. 106, 140 Misc.
Rep. 857; Halsey et al v. Winant (1931) 251 N.Y.S. 81, 233 App. Div.
103; Aylor v. Richmond (1946) 183 Tenn. 196, 191 S.W. (2d) 529;
Gatto v. Boyd (1930) 241 N.Y.S. 626, 137 Misc. Rep. 156.
'R.C.M. 1947, §29-110.
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"Where a conveyance made or obligation incurred is
fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim has not matured
he may proceed in a court of competent jurisdiction
against any person against whom he could have proceeded
had his claim matured, and the court may,
(a) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his
property,
(b) Appoint a receiver to take charge of the
property,
(c) Set aside the conveyance or annul the obligagation, or,
(d) Make any order which the circumstances of
the case may require."
The unmatured creditor could not maintain a suit at law,
so the natural implication is that a judgment at law is not necessary to maintain a suit in equity to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Should the creditor whose claim has matured be placed
in a less advantageous position? Obviously not. The Act, in its
definition of a creditor, seeks a rule of uniformity, and, in the
words of Justice Cardozo,
"This is plainly a remedial statute, designed to furnish
a creditor, as therein defined, full, complete, and speedy
relief against his fraudulent debtor. It should therefore
receive a liberal construction by the courts to accomplish
its purpose.'
III.
Montana,
in the absence of enabling
as
in
In
New
York,
1.
statute, it has been the practice of equity to refuse relief against
a conveyance in fraud of creditors until the suitor has recovered
a judgment at law establishing the debt.' New York adopted
the Uniform Act in 1925, and in 1928 the majority opinion in
the case of American Surety Company v. Conner' held that under the Act judgment and return unsatisfied are not necessary
to maintain an action to annul a debtor's fraudulent conveyance.
The creditor's attack failed on the merits of the case, but the
thorough discussion of the question of procedure by Justice Cardozo established a rule of construction which has been applied
in practically all of the cases where the question has been raised
under the provisions of the Act."
uSupra, note 8.
'Briggs v. Austin (1891) 129 N.Y. 208, 29 N.E. 4 ;Pusey and Jones Co. v.
Hanssen (1923) 261 U.S. 491, 43 S.C. 454, 67 L.Ed. 763; Natl. Tube
Works v. Ballou (1892) 13 S.C. 165, 146 U.S. 517.

'Supra, note 8
note 9.
4Supra,

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1950

3

Montana Law Review, Vol. 11 [1950], Iss. 1, Art. 7

NOTE AND COMMENT
2. The Uniform Act was adopted in Michigan in 1919. In
1924, the Michigan Supreme Court, in the case of Morse v.
Roach, held:
"With the advent of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the troublesome question of whether a levy
should be made and a bill in aid of execution filed, or a
creditor's bill filed upon return of execution, or a bill
with double aspects filed, has departed. Now, in case a
conveyance is fraudulent as to a creditor, he may file the
bills without making levies." '
Two years later, in 1926, substantially the same court, in
Comstock v. Horton et al., held:
"This court has consistently held that to authorize the
filing of a bill in aid of execution, there must be a judgment or decree fixing the amount, and execution issued
thereon, and a levy by virtue thereof, and, to authorize the
filing of a creditor's bill there must be a judgment or decree fixing the amount, and execution issued, and return
unsatisfied in whole or in part.'""
In this case neither the Uniform Act nor the 1924 ruling
was mentioned. The form of pleading does not appear.
Later, in 1931, the Michigan Supreme Court, in the case
of
HartfordAccident and Indemnity Company v. Jirasek," adopted
the rule of construction laid down in Morse v. Roach in 1924.
While an attachment suit by the plaintiffs was pending, it was
learned that the defendant had deeded the property in question
to his brother, thereby being rendered insolvent. A bill was filed
to have the deed set aside and for a money decree against the
original defendant. The court in its opinion was explicit in its
interpretation of the Act.
"To hold that these plaintiffs do not have a right to
equitable relief in this case would be to say that the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act affords a defrauded
victim no remedy which he did not have prior to the enactment of this statute. For all practical purposes it
would nullify the Act. We should and do hold that the
court of equity has and retains jurisdiction to adjudicate
the whole controversy between these litigants."'
2(1924) 229 Mich. 495, 201 N.W. 471.
(1926) 235 Mich. 282, 209 N.W. 179.
"(1931) 254 Mich. 282, 235 N.W. 836.
'hId.
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The court in the instant case explained the ruling in the
Comstock case only by saying the plaintiff in that case was not
entitled to any equitable relief whatever, but only to damages,
if any, recoverable at law.
3. The history of California decisions and legislative enactments concerning the question posed is of particular interest
as regards Montana. In James v. Schaeffer, a 1924 case, the
court held that under the provisions of section- 3441 of the California Civil Code, which is identical with R.C.M. 1947, Section
29-209 (8605), it is essential to a creditor's action to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance of a debtor's property that a claim
against such property be reduced to judgment or so far prosecuted that legal process to which he is entitled is obstructed.'
This is the same construction adopted by the Montana Supreme
Court in its interpretation of Section 29-209 (8605).' California
adopted the Uniform Act in 1939, and at the same time expressly
repealed section 3441.

In a 1943 decision, in which sections 9

(1) (a) and (b)' of the Uniform Act were interpreted, the
California court held that a creditor has the right to attack a
fraudulent conveyance before judgment.'
4. In a South Dakota case"' the court affirmed judgment
for the amount due on a note and adjudged a conveyance by the
debtor as fraudulent and void, the action having been brought
on the note and the plaintiff having asked that the conveyance
be set aside. The court ruled:
"Under the Uniform Act, upon proper pleading and
proof, relief may be gained by setting aside the conveyance fraudulent as to the plaintiff without the necessity
of securing a specific lien upon the property alleged to
have been fraudulently conveyed."
5. In Massachusetts, under the Uniform Act, a mortgagee
who apparently had not reduced his claim to judgment was held
entitled to have a fraudulent conveyance set aside to the extent
necessary to satisfy the former's claim.'
6. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Lind v. Johnson,'
held that the Uniform Act was a codification and an extension
"970 Cal. App. 372, 233 P. 70.
2
*Supra,note 1.
21Act of 1939, Chapt. 329.
2Supra, note 7.
2
2 Brunvold v. Victor Johnson (1943) 59 Cal. App. 75, 138 P.(2d) 32.
4'Virgil State Bank v. Wall (1929) 56 S.D. 318, 228 N.W. 392.
2
'Dandis v. Lash (1931) 277 Mass. 477, 178 N.E. 624.
'Lind v. Johnson (1938) 204 Minn. 30, 282 N.W. 661.
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of the former law requiring judgment against the debtor before
proceeding to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. The court
thought that section 9 (1) (a) was broad enough to "include
the old procedure of entry of judgment and return of execution
unsatisfied as well as the more modern relief given a simple
creditor." This decision fully raised the problem of limitations
under the Uniform Act. The court refused to rule that the commencement of the period of limitations is the earliest date that
the creditor could attack the conveyance, construing the Act as
giving the creditor the choice of immediately attacking the conveyance or reducing his claim to judgment and then invoking
the aid of equity.
This construction, implying a cumulative remedy, was
adopted in Pennsylvania where the court held the Uniform Act
"gives an additional optional remedy, by bill, to set aside the
conveyance to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim,
but it does not deny the judgment creditor, as formerly, to work
out his remedy at law."
7. Until 1938, Federal courts, being governed by the U. S.
Judicial Code, required that a creditor first establish a claim at
law before proceeding to equity to set the conveyance aside.'
Now, under the Federal Rule, 18 (b),
A plaintiff may state a claim for money and a
claim to have set aside a conveyance fraudulent as to him,
without first having obtained a judgment establishing the
claim for money. "
The rule was interpreted in Armour and Company of Delaware v. B. F. Bailey, Incorporated.' This was an action to recover on promissory notes and to fix a lien on real estate transferred by the maker of the notes. The court held the former
rule was abrogated by Rule 18 (b) which
... contemplates a joinder of the action to set aside
the conveyance with the action to establish the claim, the
former being ancillary to the latter, and the debtor being
an indispensable party."'
The federal rule now conforms with sections 9 and 10 of the
'Canemaugh Iron Works Co. (1929) 298 Pa. 182, 148 A. 94.
"Brown v. American Laundry Machine Co. (1932) 56 F. 2d 197; White
v. Finance Corp. (1933) 63 F.(2d) 168; Scott v. Neeley (1891) 140
U.S. 106, 11 S.C. 712, 35 L.Ed. 358.
'Rule 18 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
"C.C.A. 5th (1942) 132 F. 2d 386.
311.
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Uniform Act,' as construed in the majority
question was raised under the provisions
change suggests a desire by the framers to
legislation with existing uniform legislation.
implies that the remedy is cumulative.

of cases where the
of the Act. The
coordinate federal
The rule strongly

IV.
1. Two New Jersey cases have declared the Uniform Act
unconstitutional, so far as it purports to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance without existence of a lien.' The question raised was
a jurisdictional one, and likely to appear where a state adheres
to a strict division between law and equity. The practice of
maintaining separate courts of law and equity has survived in
New Jersey, and the constitution prohibits the use of courts of
equity for the purpose of establishing money judgments." Sections 9 and 10 of the Act,' as amended in New Jersey, now
specifically require that a claim be established according to law
before a conveyance can be set aside.'
2. Arizona and Wisconsin have held, since adoption of the
Uniform Act, that if a creditor wishes to follow property fraudulently transferred, it is necessary to first procure judgment and
exhaust his remedies against the debtor.' However, in each of
these cases, the decision was made without reference to the Act
and without professing to construe it.
V.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act recognizes the old
legal remedy of a judgment creditor and simply extends it to the
non-lien creditor.' Consequently, a creditor could still effectively proceed under the provisions of R.C.M. 1947, Section 29-209
.(8605) regardless of how the Montana Supreme Court eventually
construes Sections 29-109 and 29-110. However, Section 29-209
(8605) is an express limitation upon the right of a creditor to
proceed in equity.' Without a judgment and return unsatisfied
the right would not exist. If the Montana Supreme Court should
hold with the majority rule under the Uniform Act, as expressed
'Supra, ndte 4.
'Horstman Co. v. Rothfuss (1940) 128 N.J. Eq. 168, 15 A.(2d) 623;
Neild v. Morris (1941) 130 N.J. Eq. 53, 21 A.(2d) 153.
"Article' VI, §§I, IV, Con8titution of N.J. as Amended.
'Supra, note 4.
"N.J.S.A. 25: 2-15, 25: 2-16.
'Hookway v. Hammons (1928) 34 Ariz. 23, 267 P. 415; Lipman v. Langer
(1924) 185 Wisc. 63, 200 N.W. 663.
"Supra, notes 26, 27.
"Ferrell v. Elling (1929) 84 Mont. 384, 392, 276 P. 432, 435.
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in American Surety Company v. Conner,' the heart of Section
29-209 (8605), the "limitation" factor, will be cut out. Its
existence in the codes would serve only to confuse and mislead.
In this event, Montana should follow the lead of California and
repeal the statute (29-209). If the court should hold that a
judgment and return nulla bona is still a prerequisite to proceeding in equity, Sections 29-109 and 29-110 should be amended
to avoid confusion with Section 29-209 (8605)."
In a suit to set aside a conveyance alleged to be fraudulent
the plaintiff must establish a claim against the alleged fraudulent grantor in order to qualify as a "creditor" under the provisions of section 1 of the Act.' The debtor is an indispensable
party. ' Section 93-3203 (9130) states that ". . . The causes of
action so united must ... belong to one only of the classes, and
must affect all the parties to the action." It could be argued
that the causes of action can not be joined in that the alleged
fraudulent grantee is not a party to the action attempting to
establish the claim," and that the claim must therefore be first
established in a suit at law before equitable relief will be
granted. On this point it is submitted that the Uniform Act
being the later enactment, the rule expressed by section 29-3203
(9130) should not be applicable in actions to set aside fraudulent
conveyances. The intention to modify the preexisting rule does
hot appear in the provisions of the Act, but it should be sufficient if it appears from the language that no other purpose
than to permit the joinder of these actions is a permissible interpretation.
The form of trial should not be difficult to work out even
though both legal and equitable issues are present, together with
the constitutional right to trial by jury on the legal issue.' If
the parties do not waive trial by jury the court may choose to
have the equitable issues tried to the jury also and send the
entire case to the jury. It is also possible for the court to hear
the equitable issues along with consideration of the legal issues
by the jury, the judgment proper to be entered by the court on
the basis of various findings of fact. As another alternative, the
equitable issues might be tried separate from the trial of the jury
issues.'
'Supra, note 8.

"See note 36, Supra, whereby New Jersey amended sections 9 and 10 of

the Uniform Act to require that a claim be established at law before

proceeding to equity to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.

-R.C.M. 1947 §29-101.
"Supra, note 31.
"Baker v. Hanson et al. (1924) 72 Mont. 22, 31, 231 P. 902.
"Article 3, section 23, Montana Constitution
OCLRiK oN CODE PLEDING (1947), p. 106, 107.
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The danger of innocent purchasers cutting off the creditor
by a fraudulent conveyance pendente lite can be remedied by
adoption of the rule of construction laid down in the majority
of decisions under the Uniform Act. Multiplicity of suits can
be avoided, and the creditor will be given the efficient optional
remedy which the Act means to provide."
GEORGE P. SARSFIELD.
"Supra, notes 26, 27.

PEACEFUL PICKETING AS AN EXERCISE OF
FREE SPEECH
Picketing is the favorite weapon used by trade unions during their disputes with management over what shall constitute
equitable distribution of the fruits of industry. It enjoys union
favor because of its effectiveness in promoting labor's ends. Employers receiving the picketing "treatment" are not so fond of
the process however, and acting accordingly, have challenged its
legality under constitutional provisions, statutes, and the judicial
precedents. A portion of the resulting body of law is to be considered herein.
Today, the books record decisions of the highest American
court wherein peaceful picketing is designated as a form of
speech.' Therefore, an activity, formerly considered tortious by
many courts, rests comparatively secure under the guardianship
of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It will be
submitted below that Montana decisions holding picketing to be
speech have contributed to this rather spectacular change in the
legal status of the activity, and evidence supporting such assertion will be offered. Further, it will be contended that, although
the doctrine as originally announced by the U. S. Supreme Court
has been seriously limited by that body in subsequent cases, Montana law on the subject has not been generally affected thereby.
The contention that peaceful picketing is simply a form of
speech is as old as the legal history of the activity itself. In
Sherry v. Perkins,' the first peaceful picketing case,' counsel of'Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093;
American Federation of Labor v. Swing (1940) 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct.
568, 85, L.Ed. 855.
'(1888) 147 Mass. 212, 17 N.E. 307.
3Mr.
Justice Brandies credits Sherry v. Perkins with being the first
peaceful picketing case in his dissent in Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 257
U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254, 27 A.L.R. 375.
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